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FOREWORD 
The Search and Rescue Antenna (SRA) Inadvertent Deployment Mishap Investigation 
Team (MIT) was commissioned to gather information; analyze the facts; identify the 
proximate causes, contributing factors, and root causes relating to the mishap; and 
recommend appropriate actions to prevent a similar mishap from recurring in the future. 
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CHARTER 
Reference NPR 8621.1 "NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap Reporting, 
Investigating, and Recordkeeping" for establishing the NOAA-N Prime SAR Antenna 
Inadvertent Deployment Mishap Investigation Team (MIT) and sets forth its 
responsibilities and membership. 
In accordance with the NPR, the NOAA-N Prime SRA Inadvertent Deployment Mishap 
Investigation Team is established to gather information; analyze the facts; identify the 
proximate cause(s), root cause(s) and contributing factors relating to the mishap; and to 
recommend appropriate actions to prevent a similar mishap from occurring again. 
The Chairperson of the Team will report to the Appointing Official on all aspects 
regarding this investigation. 
The Team will: 
Obtain and analyze whatever evidence, facts, and opinions it considers relevant. 
Conduct tests and any other activity it deems appropriate. 
Interview witnesses and receive statements from witnesses. 
Impound property, equipment, and records as considered necessary (consistent 
with the agreements with the international partners and contractors). 
Determine the proximate cause(s), root cause(s), and contributing factors relating 
to the mishap. 
Develop recommendations to prevent similar mishaps. 
Provide a final written report that will conform to all requirements in the 
referenced NPR. 
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The Chairperson will: 
Conduct Team activities in accordance with the requirements in NPR 8621 .I .  
Establish and document, as necessary, rules and procedures for organizing and 
operating the Team, including any subgroups, and for the format and content of 
oral or written reports to and by the Team. 
Designate any additional representatives, advisors, consultants, experts, liaison 
officers, or other individuals who may be required to support the activities of the 
Team and define the duties and responsibilities of those persons. 
Designate another voting member of the Team to act as chairperson in his or her 
absence. 
Document meetings and retain records. 
The Team will provide a final report within 75 workdays. 
Mishap Date: April 14,2007 
The following individuals are the voting members of the MIT: 
The following individuals will serve as the Ex Officio on the MIT, and complete 
applicable tasks as outlined in NPR 8621.1 : 
Name 
Eric Clemons 
Mike Hagopian 
Phil Sabelhaus 
Organization 
NOAA 
NASA 
NASA 
Name 
Jerome Kosko 
Responsibility on Board 
Member 
Member 
Chairperson-Member 
Organization 
NASA 
Responsibility on Board 
Ex Offcio 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The NOAA N' Search and Rescue Antenna (SRA) inadvertently deployed during a 
spacecraft rotation on April 14,2007. This rotation was part of a normal operation to 
configure the spacecraft for additional antenna and the solar array boom deployments. 
This procedure (red flag written) had been modified to look for a lost metal washer and a 
thermal blanket button. The modification to the procedure was reviewed and approved 
by the Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space (LMMS) Material Review Board (MRB) per 
standard procedures. The flag to the procedure introduced a counter clockwise rotation 
before the normal clockwise rotation. The antenna was temporally stowed and held in 
place via lacing cord. The lacing cord broke and allowed the SRA to inadvertently 
deploy during the clockwise rotation. The SRA broke through a hard stop bracket and 
damaged an instrument optical sensor radiator panel. The satellite damage appears to be 
minimal and there were no injuries to personnel. The damage to the Advanced 
Microwave Sounding Unit (AMSU)-A1 instrument has not been fully assessed. 
Based on mishap site visits, interviews and data analysis, the Mishap Investigation Team 
(MIT) identified the underlying causes of the mishap. Event and causal factor tree 
diagrams were developed, resulting in the identification of the proximate (or direct) cause 
and root causes of the mishap. 
Proximate Cause: 
Proximate Cause (PC)- As tied (with a box knot), the lacing system used to 
temporarily stow the SRA, could not support the loads it was subjected to during 
the rotisserie/horizontal operation. 
o Contributing Factor 1 (CF1)- The tie procedure is non-specific and will 
not result in a consistent tie performance: no specific requirement of 
which lacing cord to use (3 sizes were available for use), instructions of 
how to tie the lacing cord are vague and technician access is limited. 
Therefore the load capability of as-tied lacing cord restraint is not 
deterministic. 
CF1 A- Failure analysis showed the lacing cord used met its 
manufacturing specifications but that its strength was reduced by 
-50% with the introduction of a box knot. 
CFlB- Structural analysis showed insufficient load-carrying 
capability of this lacing cord. Load carrying capability of this tie 
restraint system had never been analyzed prior to the mishap. 
Subsequent analysis predicts a tension load of up to 69 lbs, which 
exceeds the specified lacing cord strength of 50 lbs, and the 
nominal knotted strength of 28 lbs. 
o Contributing Factor 2 (CF2)- A Functional Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FFMEA) was not performed for the satellite in this 
configuration (using a lacing cord tie restraint system for the SRA) and 
subjected to this operation (horizontal rotisserie). 
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o Contributing Factor 3 (CF3)- Preferred hard stows were difficult to 
implement since the "Big Joe" lift was removed from usage in 2002. 
o Contributing Factor 4 (CF4)- The SRA stow procedure did not specify any 
operational constraints or restrictions. 
Root cause and Recommendations: 
Root Cause (RC)- Lack of due diligence, inadequate EngineeringIManagement 
practices which led to a vague procedure. 
o Recommendation 1 (R1)- Evaluate all spacecraft configurations to ensure 
adequate margin exists for the stowage of all deployables. 
= Rla- Minimize the use and time allowed for temporary stowage of 
deployables. 
Rlb- Reexamine all spacecraft configurations for the safety of 
flight hardware and personnel. 
o Recommendation 2 (R2)- If used, the load carrying capability of this tie 
approach should be conservatively assessed. 
2A (R2A)- Perform FFMEAs and ensure conservative load 
carrying capability for this or any temporary stow approach 
includes appropriate factors of safety for a proposed operation. 
o Recommendation 3 (R3)- Review all heritage spacecraft procedures that 
address deployable stowage to ensure they are specific on the type and 
size, number, location and routing of securing devices. Add operational 
constraints or restrictions to the procedures. Make sure the procedures are 
repeatable in different times and with different operators and ensure that 
the proper training is provided on the revised procedures. 
o Recommendation 4 (R4)- Make tie procedure more specific, review and 
update existing drawings and develop new as needed. 
o Recommendation 5 (R5)- Limit use of temporary stow configurations, 
develop a temporary stow process for each deployable. 
(R5A)- Set standards for maximum length of time allowed for and 
operational constraints or restrictions on temporary stows. 
o Recommendation 6 (R6)- Review existing planning and approval 
processes to ensure critical Certified Principle Engineer(s) CPE(s) are 
fully engaged; this includes their being identified based on current 
configuration and proposed operation, and specifically polled with regard 
to the safety of the proposed operation. 
o Recommendation 7 (R7)- Modify agenda of operational planning meetings 
to call out discussion on "special" hardware configuration conditions: 
Non flight hardware connected to the spacecraft 
Temporarily stowed deployment hardware 
Missing flight hardware 
Flight hardware with known operational constraints or restrictions 
o Recommendation 8 (R8)- Take and maintain photos of non standard 
spacecraft configurations prior to testing and/or spacecraft movements. 
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Significant Observations: 
Observation 1 (01)- Lacing cord was used successfully in a similar application in 
2003. The technician who performed the stowing operation in 2003 was 
interviewed. He stated that the lacing cord was placed on the antenna in similar 
fashion; however it was doubled up at each location. The technician specifically 
stated using two "ties" at each location, using a mid-sized lacing tape. This would 
explain why the operation was successful in 2003. 
Observation 10 (01 0)- Operational constraints did not specify personnel "keep 
out" zones for inadvertent deployments, and a QA representative on the floor was 
in the proximate location of the swinging SRA. 
o Recommendation 9 (R9)- Implement "keep out" zones for temporarily 
stowed deployables during operations which move the spacecraft. 
vii 
Mishap Report 
October 2007 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
Greenbelt, Maryland 
June 19,2007 
The MIT for the NOAA N' Search and Rescue Inadvertent Deployment mishap 
was established according to NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8621. lB, 
"NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating 
and Recordkeeping," on April 14,2007, to gather information; analyze the facts, 
identify the proximate cause(s), root cause(s), and contributing factor(s) relating to 
the mishap; and to recommend appropriate actions to prevent a similar mishap from 
recurring. 
The review and endorsement of the MIT Report was conducted by the MIT 
Appointing Official, and the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. 
The receipt of the endorsement letter was completed on July 29,2007,2007, and 
the cornments/recornmendations of the endorsers were carefully evaluated. Based 
upon this evaluation, the SRA Inadvertent Deployment Report is approved. 
Should you have comments concerning this matter, please reach Dr. Edward Weiler 
at 301 -286-5121 or by e-mail to Edward.J.Weiler@nasa.gov 
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National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
Greenbelt, Maryland 
June 19,2007 
To: NASA Headquarters 
Mn:  Chief Safety and Miss& ksurance OfFker 
From: AAlDirector 
Subject: Endorsement of the Investigation ~f the NO@ N''Searcl.l and Rescue 
Antenna Inadvertent DepbyrnM:Tm> C Mism;Report 
I have reviewed the Mishap Investigation Report of the NOAA N' Search and 
Antenna Rescue Inadvertent Deployment and recommend the report for approval. I 
concur that the report has been prepared as directed by the appointment letter and 
meets the requirements specified in NPR 862 1.1. 
Dr. Edward Weiler 
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1. MISHAP DESCRIPTION 
Summary 
The NOAA-N Prime Search and Rescue Antenna (SRA) inadvertently deployed during a 
spacecraft rotation on April 14, 2007 (Figure 1). This rotation was part of a normal 
operation to configure the spacecraft for additional antenna and the solar array boom 
deployments. This procedure (red flag written) had been modified to look for a lost metal 
washer and a thermal blanket button. The flag to the procedure introduced a counter 
clockwise rotation before the normal clockwise rotation. The antenna was temporally 
stowed and held in place via lacing cord. The lacing cord broke and allowed the SRA to 
inadvertently deploy during the clockwise rotation. The SRA broke through a hard stop 
bracket and damaged an instrument optical sensor radiator panel. The satellite damage 
appeared to be minimal (Figures 2 and 3) and there were no injuries to personnel. 
Figure 1 
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2 
Figure 2 
3 
Figure 3 
2. Relevant Background: 
NOAA-N Prime deployable systems include the SRA, the Solar Array (SA) Panels and 
Boom, the Very High Frequency (VHF) Real time Antenna (VRA), the Advanced Data 
collection system Antenna (ADA), and the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Data collection 
system Antenna (UDA). The SRA is deployed with the spacecraft in a vertical 
orientation, with special Mechanical/mobile Aerospace Ground Equipment (MAGE) 
installed to gravity-negate the antenna. The SA Panels are also deployed with the 
spacecraft in a vertical orientation, while all other deployments are performed with the 
spacecraft horizontal. In order to facilitate handling of the spacecraft for these tests, a 
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Turn Over Cart (TOC) is used which can re-orient the spacecraft from vertical to 
horizontal, and allow axial rotation of the spacecraft when in the horizontal position. 
This axial rotation is sometimes referred to as a "rotisserie" motion. An Operational 
Hazards Assessment (OHA) and Functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FFMEA) were performed for this TOC, but that analysis is primarily focused on the 
design and load carrying capability of the fixture, without a broad assessment of various 
possible spacecraft configurations. 
The historical Integration and Test (I&T) sequence of events, going back to Television 
Infrared Operational Satellite (TIROS) N, was for the SRA to be deployed with the 
spacecraft vertical and removed prior to rotating the spacecraft to a horizontal orientation 
for other deployments. To accomplish this flow for the SRA, a procedure was run by 
which the antenna was temporarily "soft" stowed with lacing cord, before being more 
securely "hard" temporarily stowed with a non-flight bolt and T-nut. The "hard" stow 
operation required safe placement of multiple personnel so that the antenna could be held 
in a partially deployed position while pyrotechnic and other hardware was removed. This 
operation was accomplished with the use of a "Big Joe" lift, which allowed three people 
to work side by side on the antenna. Subsequent operations to remove the SRA from the 
spacecraft also required the use of this same lift device. It is important to note that when 
the procedure was generated, the intended use of the "soft" stow operation was to 
temporarily safe the SRA until a more secure "hard" stow could be effected, ultimately 
leading to the SRA being removed before the spacecraft was re-oriented to horizontal. 
Sometime in 2002, before similar I&T operations were run for NOAA N-Prime, 
Lockheed Martin lost the use of the "Big Joe" lift device. SRA stow and removal 
operations were now limited by the use of the "Marklift" device, which could only 
accommodate one person on its work platform. This change directly affected practical 
workflow as it pertained to deployment testing. In December of 2002, following 
successful deployment of the SRA, the antenna was "soft" stowed using lacing cord. 
This operation was done in accordance with the existing SRA procedure and prior 
experience. The "hard" stow operation was "NIA'ed" in the procedure. This is permitted 
by the project, as the Certified Test Conductor (CTC) is authorized to make modifications 
to the procedures (procedural note: "per CTC direction, sections of this procedure may be 
performed out of order as required"). The spacecraft was then rotated to a horizontal 
position using the turnover cart, a position which allowed the personnel access required 
to remove the SRA. The SRA, however, was not removed. The plan was to continue 
with deployment testing of the VRA, and the UDA, which required a rotisserie rotation of 
the spacecraft while in the horizontal position. Doing the deployments in this sequence 
offered schedule efficiencies. After all deployment testing was complete, the VRA, UDA 
and SRA were removed. The lacing cord held, and this new sequence became the new 
baseline. 
This new operational sequence was not originally intended when the lacing cord tie 
procedure was written, although changes in flow were permitted at the discretion of the 
CTC. In any case, we now know that the lacing cord tie only worked because the 
technician performing the operation doubled up the cord. He apparently did this at his 
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own discretion, and the procedure was not specific enough to ensure this would be done 
in the future. 
3. Timeline of Events Leading to the April 14,2007 Mishap 
Pre-vibration test deployments of the SA Boom, VRA, UDA, ADA, SRA and SA Panels 
were completed on February 12, 2007. Dynamics testing (acoustic, sine vibe, and 
pyrotechnic shock) was completed on March 13,2007. With the spacecraft vertical, post- 
dynamics SA Panel deployment and removal was completed on April 2,2007. The SRA 
post-dynamics deployment and temporary stow was completed on April 5,2007. Lacing 
cord was used, this time the cord was not doubled up. This technician followed the same 
vague procedure, and did not happen to tie the lacing cord in the same way the other 
technician had tied it four years earlier. 
Meanwhile, with Dynamics testing nearly finished, and no sign of a missing Microwave 
Humidity Sounder (MHS) blanket button (first noted missing on January 15,2007), or of 
an Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit (AMSU) conductive washer (dropped on 
February 28,2007), discussions continued regarding how to disposition the related Q- 
Notes 200051721 and 200054835. A Material Review Board (MRB) meeting was held 
on March 12,2007, and it was decided to continue processing the spacecraft, and look for 
opportunities for additional inspection after the spacecraft was moved to the TOC, which 
allowed a -1 80 to +I80 degree rotisserie with the spacecraft in a horizontal orientation. A 
Flag was later generated (April 5,2007), authorizing this axial rotation to look for the 
missing hardware. This Flag was added to the SA Boom deployment procedure, 
specifying covering the TOC below the spacecraft with scrim prior to rotation to 
catchlidentify any falling debris. This additional operation began with a 
counterclockwise (CCW) rotation, to be potentially followed by a clockwise (CW) 
rotation if the missing debris had still not been found. 
The spacecraft was moved onto the TOC on April 12,2007 in preparation for rotating 
horizontal to facilitate horizontal deployment testing scheduled to begin a few days later. 
The first test planned was the SA Boom deployment, but it was determined during a 
Suspended Load Operations (SLO) meeting on April 13,2007 that additional paperwork 
was required before that test could be performed. The program decided to continue with 
other deployments (UDA and ADA) while preparing for the SA Boom deployment. 
They also decided to move the Flag authorizing axial rotation of the vehicle to look for 
the missing hardware, from the SA Boom deployment procedure to the ADA deployment 
procedure (TP-ADA), which was currently being run. While this new deployment 
sequence did not change the load environment seen by the SRA temporary stow (lacing 
cord tie restraint) from the baseline test sequence, the Flag did introduce a new CCW 
rotation that could have affected the SRA cuplcone engagement (if the lacing cord 
stretched and restraint preload changed) prior to CW rotation. In any case, the lacing 
cord restraint system, as tied, did not have the load carrying capability required for the 
CW rotation. The spacecraft was rotated on the TOC from vertical to horizontal at 1620 
on 411 3/07, and the work shift ended. 
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The team met early the following Saturday morning, April 14,2007, at 0640 for a Pre- 
Task briefing, which included TP-ADA with the Flag inserted. At 0700 a mini-huddle 
was held, followed directly by the start of a CCW axial rotation from +X up to +X down, 
none of the missing material was found and nothing unusual was noted with respect to 
the SRA temporary restraint. There were several personnel on the floor around the TOC 
looking and listening for falling debris. After another mini-huddle at 0730, CW axial 
rotation commenced, to go from +X up back to +X down. After about 50 degrees of 
rotation from +X up the SRA broke free from its restraint, swung down through its stop 
point, and hit the AMSU A1 Optical Surface Reflector (OSR) panel before coming to rest 
in an over deployed position. The area was secured, management notified, witness 
statements taken, and hardware safed, as the "SRA Inadvertent Deployment" mishap 
investigation began. 
4. Findings and Observations: 
Proximate cause: 
Proximate Cause (PC)- As tied (with a box knot), the lacing system used to temporarily 
stow the SRA, could not support the loads it was subjected to during the 
rotisserie/horizontal operation (Figure 4). 
4 
Figure 4 
Contributing Factors: 
Contributing Factor 1 (CF1)- The tie procedure is non-specific and will not result in a 
consistent tie performance: no specific requirement of which lacing cord to use (3 sizes 
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were available for use), instructions of how to tie the lacing cord are vague and technician 
access is limited. Therefore the load capability of as-tied lacing cord restraint is not 
deterministic. 
CF1 A- Failure analysis showed the lacing cord used met its manufacturing 
specifications (Table 1) but that its strength was reduced by -50% with the 
introduction of a box knot (Table 2). 
CFlB- Structural analysis showed insufficient load-carrying capability of this lacing 
cord. Load carrying capability of this tie restraint system had never been analyzed 
prior to the mishap. Subsequent analysis predicts a tension load of up to 69 lbs, 
which exceeds the specified lacing cord strength of 50 lbs, and the nominal knotted 
strength of 28 lbs. 
Contributing Factor 2 (CF2)- A Functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FFMEA) 
was not performed for the satellite in this configuration (using a lacing cord tie restraint 
system for the SRA) and subjected to this operation (horizontal rotisserie). 
Contributing Factor 3 (CF3)- Preferred hard stows were difficult to implement since the 
"Big Joe" lift was removed from usage in 2002. 
Contributing Factor 4 (CF4)- The SRA stow procedure did not specify any operational 
constraints or restrictions. 
Observations: 
Observation 1 (01)- Lacing cord was used successfully in a similar application in 2003. 
The technician who performed the stowing operation in 2003 was interviewed. He stated 
that the lacing cord was placed on the antenna in similar fashion; however it was doubled 
up at each location. The technician specifically stated using two "ties" at each location, 
using a mid-sized lacing tape. This would explain why the operation was successful in 
2003. 
Observation 2 (02)- LMMS Fishbone analysis conducted on April 19,2007supports the 
causes identified. 
Observation 3 (03)- Applicable procedures and processes were followed. 
Observation 4 (04)- Personnel involved in the operations had proper training and up-to- 
date certification in accordance with LMMS processes. 
Observation 5 (05)- Operations personnel correctly followed the post mishap procedure. 
Observation 6 (06)- Staff performing this activity had not been overworked. This was 
the 1" Saturday work in previous six weeks. 
Observation 7 (07)- Appears that previous Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) 
recommendations from the 2002 incident were followed including the recommendation to 
review all Integration and Test (I&T) procedures before their use. 
Observation (08)- Responsible SRA systems engineer was not specifically sought out in 
the planning process for this operation: no process to identify which Certified Product 
Engineer(s) (CPEs) are critical to engage prior to approving and running an operation 
based on details of that operation and the spacecraft configuration, no requirement for 
critical CPE(s) to provide information supporting the safety of an operation. 
Observation 9 (09)- Close out photos of pre-mishap configuration were not taken. 
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Observation 10 (01 0)- Operational constraints did not specify personnel "keep out" 
zones for inadvertent deployments, and a QA representative on the floor was in the 
proximate location of the swinging SRA. 
Observation 11 (01 1)- The SRA procedure spelled out how to install, deploy, 
temporarily "soft" stow, temporarily "hard" stow, and remove the antenna. The original 
intent of the temporary "soft" stow (with lacing cord) step in the procedure was only to 
hold the SRA, with the spacecraft in a vertical orientation, in preparation for a temporary 
"hard" stow (with bolt). 
Root cause: 
Root Cause (RC)- Lack of due diligence, inadequate EngineeringlManagement practices 
which led to a vague procedure. 
5. Recommendations: 
Recommendation 1 (R1)- Evaluate all spacecraft configurations to ensure adequate 
margin exists for the stowage of all deployables. 
Rl  a- Minimize the use and time allowed for temporary stowage of deployables. 
Rlb- Reexamine all spacecraft configurations for the safety of flight hardware 
and personnel. 
Recommendation 2 (R2)- If used, the load carrying capability of this tie approach should 
be conservatively assessed. 
2A (R2A)- Perform FFMEAs and ensure conservative load carrying capability for 
this or any temporary stow approach includes appropriate factors of safety for a 
proposed operation. 
Recommendation 3 (R3)- Review all heritage spacecraft procedures that address 
deployable stowage to ensure they are specific on the type and size, number, location and 
routing of securing devices. Add operational constraints or restrictions to the procedures. 
Make sure the procedures are repeatable in different times and with different operators 
and ensure that the proper training is provided on the revised procedures. 
Recommendation 4 (R4)- Make tie procedure more specific, review and update existing 
drawings and develop new as needed. 
Recommendation 5 (R5)- Limit use of temporary stow configurations, develop a 
temporary stow process for each deployable. 
(R5A)- Set standards for maximum length of time allowed for and operational 
constraints or restrictions on temporary stows. 
Recommendation 6 (R6)- Review existing planning and approval processes to ensure 
critical Certified Principle Engineers CPE(s) are fully engaged; this includes their being 
identified based on current configuration and proposed operation, and specifically polled 
with regard to the safety of the proposed operation. 
Recommendation 7 (R7)- Modify agenda of operational planning meetings to call out 
discussion on "special" hardware configuration conditions: 
Non flight hardware connected to the spacecraft 
Temporarily stowed deployment hardware 
Missing flight hardware 
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Flight hardware with known operational constraints or restrictions 
Recommendation 8 (R8)- Take and maintain photos of non standard spacecraft 
configurations prior to testing and/or spacecraft movements. 
Recommendation 9 (R9)- Implement "keep out" zones for temporarily stowed 
deployables during operations which move the spacecraft. 
6. NOAA-N Prime Incident 2003 
The MIT reviewed the NOAA-N Prime incident that occurred in 2003 to see if the 
possible causes of this incident were somehow connected. We reviewed the proximate 
cause and root causes for applicability. We also evaluated the implementation of the 
pertinent 2003 incident recommendations. In the end, we didn't find any systemic 
connection between the causes of this incident and the 2003 incident. In addition, we felt 
that the previous recommendations that were applicable were implemented. 
The original incident occurred on Saturday, September 6,2003 during an operation at 
Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company (LMS SC) Sunnyvale California that required 
repositioning the Television Infrared Observational Satellites (TIROS) National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) N-Prime satellite from a vertical to a 
horizontal position, the satellite slipped fiom the Turn-Over Cart (TOC) and fell to the 
floor. The satellite sustained heavy damage although no injuries to personnel occurred. 
The operation scheduled for that day was to shim the Microwave Humidity Sounder 
(MHS) instrument by removing and replacing the instrument. This operation required the 
spacecraft to be rotated and tilted to the horizontal position using the TOC. The 
spacecraft fell to the floor as it reached 13 degrees of tilt while being rotated. 
Proximate cause (PC1): The NOAA N-Prime satellite fell because the LMSSC 
operations team failed to follow procedures properly configure the TOC, such that the 24 
bolts that were needed to secure the TOC adapter plate to the TOC were not installed. 
The root causes identified by the MIB were summarized as: R1) The TOC adapter was 
not secured to the TOC because the LMSSC operations team failed to execute their 
satellite handling procedures. R2) The LMSSC operations team's lack of discipline in 
following procedures evolved from complacent attitudes toward routine spacecraft 
handling, poor communication and coordination among operations team, and poorly 
written or modified procedures. R3) The preconditions within integration and test (I&T) 
operations described above existed because of unsafe supervision practices within the 
LMSSC project organization, including ad hoc planning of operations, inadequate 
oversight, failure to correct known problems, and supervisory violations. R4) The unsafe 
supervision practices within the TIROS program had their roots in the LMSSC 
organization: the inadequate resources and emphasis provided for safety and quality 
assurance functions: the unhealthy mix of dynamic I&T climate with a well-established 
program and routine operations; and the lack of standard, effective process guidelines and 
safeguards for operations all negatively influenced the project team and activities. R5) 
The in-plant government representation, Defense Contract Management Agency 
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(DCMA), and the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Quality Assurance (QA)/safety 
function failed to provide adequate oversight to identify and correct deficiencies in 
LMSSC operational processes, and thus failed to address or prevent the conditions that 
allowed the mishap to occur. R6) The Governments inability to identify and correct 
deficiencies in the TIROS operations and LMSSC oversight processes were due to 
inadequate resource management, an unhealthy organizational climate, and the lack of 
effective oversight processes. 
MIB Implementation Review Team 
One of the recommendations coming out of the September 3,2004 NOAA-N Prime 
Investigation Report was a separate follow-up investigation should be conducted to 
further examine and characterize a number of systemic problems. 
In response, on August 30, 2005 the first Implementation Review Team (IRT) 
independent review was successfully held. The review team consisted of non-POES 
project experts fiom NASA and NOAA. The POES project was very responsive and 
open in providing the data the review team needed to address compliance with the 8 MIB 
recommendations. It was this teams view that all of the MIB recommendations were 
being adequately (fully) implemented. 
In November of 2006 the NASA/NOAA NOAA N7 Implementation Review Team met 
for the second time and their assessment is as follows: 
The second Implementation Review Team (IRT) independent review was successfully 
held on November 2,2006. The review team consisted of non-POES project experts 
fiom NASA and NOAA. The POES project was very responsive and open in providing 
the data the review team needed to address continued compliance with the 8 Mishap 
Investigation Board (MIB) recommendations. It is this team's assessment that all of the 
MIB recommendations were still being fully implemented. In addition, the POES project 
implemented all of the recommendations made by the IRT in August, 2005. 
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Tensile Test Results 
a Straight tensile pull tests from 
TlROS provided spools 
a Sizes tested -0050 and -001 5 
a -0050 used to secure SRA 
a LAC 25-5003-0050 
- Max Elong: 40% - Pass 
- Min. Load: 50 lbs -- Pass 
a LAC 25-5004-001 5 
- Max Elong: 40% -- Pass 
- Min. Load: 1 5 I bs - Pass 
Specimen label Lot No. Elongation Max Load Dash 
(Lot -Tension -Trial ) (%) Ibf No. 
- 
100603-T-1 20 62.9 -0050 
100603-T-3 20 63.3 
100603-T-4 20 63.2 
100603-T-5 13 61.7 
100603-T-6 23 63.6 
100603-T-7 20 63.0 
Average 19 62.9 
Std. Dev 3 0.6 
052206-T-1 20 66.3 -0050 
052206-T-2 23 63.0 
052206-T-3 20 64.9 
052206-T-4 23 66.8 
052206-T-5 20 67.2 
Average 21 656 
Std. Dev 2 1.7 
3181-T-1 17 29.8 -0015 
3181-T-2 17 27.7 
3181-T-3 17 29.3 
3181-T-4 13 30.1 
3181-T-5 17 29.0 
3181-T-6 13 29.9 
Average 16 29.3 
Std. Dev 2 0.9 
Table 1 
Mishap Report 
October 2007 :*! 
Tensile Test Resuits - Knots +& 
*%k,, rt' 
e Tensile tests with knots 
e Knots tied by TlROS 
Tech 
e Breaks observed at 
knots 
Substantial reduction in 
breaking strength with 
knots 
- (62.9-28.2)162.9 = 54% 
- (65.6-27.9)165.6 57% 
Specimen label Lot No. 
(Lot - (Knot) -Trial ) Max, Load (Ibf) Dash No. 
052206-Square Knot-I 28.3 -0050 
052206-Square Knot-2 29.5 
052206-Square Knot-3 23.7 
052206-Square Knot-4 26.7 
052206-Square Knot-5 32.7 
Average 28.2 
Std. Dev. 3.3 
100603-Square Knot-I 28.4 -0050 
100603-Square Knot-2 25.6 
100603-Square Knot-3 27.2 
100603-Square Knot-4 25.9 
100603-Square Knotd 32.2 
Average 27.9 
Std. Dev. 2.7 
31 81-Square Knot-I 12.1 -0015 
31 81 -Square Knot-2 13.3 
31 81 -Square Knot3 9.6 
31 81 -Square Knot-4 12.5 
31 81 -Square Knot4 14.1 
Average 12.3 
Std. Dev. 1.7 
Table 2 
ACRONYMS LIST 
ADA 
AMSU 
CPE 
CTC 
CW 
CF 
CCW 
DCMA 
FFMEA 
GSFC 
IRT 
I&T 
LMMS 
LMSSC 
MRB 
MAGE 
MHS 
MIT 
NOAA 
OHA 
OSR 
PC 
Q A 
RC 
SRA 
SA 
SLO 
TIROS 
TOC 
UDA 
UHF 
VHF 
VRA 
Advanced Data collection system Antenna 
Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit 
Certified Product Engineer 
Certified Test Conductor 
Clockwise 
Contributing Factor 
Counterclockwise 
Defense Contract Management Agency 
Functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
Implementation Review Team 
Integration and Test 
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space 
Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company 
Material Review Board 
Mechanical/mobile Aerospace Ground Equipment 
Microwave Humidity Sounder 
Mishap Investigation Team 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
Operational Hazards Assessment 
Optical Sun Reflector 
Proximate Cause 
Quality Assurance 
Root Cause 
Search and Rescue Antenna 
Solar Array 
Suspended Load Operations 
Television Infrared Operational Satellite 
Turn Over Cart 
UHF Data collection system Antenna 
Ultra High Frequency 
Very High Frequency 
VHF Real Time Antenna 
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1.2 Signature Pages 
Concurrences by Board members: 
Phillip Sabelhaus 
Chairperson 
Code 443lGoddard Space Flight Center 
Mike Hagopian 
Voting Member Volunteer 
Eric Clemons 
Voting Member 
NOAA 
Concurrence by Ex-Officio Board Member: 
Jerome Kosko 
Safety 
Code 300lGSFC 
